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Abstract
The construction of the two symbiotic narratives of “opening” and “globalization” 
makes it possible for China’s leaders to present their policies, and in a wider perspective 
their rule, as an objective necessity. China’s economic growth is represented as a result 
of the post-1978 Opening policy, while globalization is said to demand a strong and 
unifi ed state that can defend Chinese interests. The paper discusses the different stages 
in the construction of these narratives.
1. Introduction
In December 2008 China celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of its pol-
icy of Reform and Opening (gaige kaifang), which was announced at 
the 3rd plenum of the 11th National Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) in 1978. In his celebration speech Hu Jintao, China’s presi-
dent and general secretary of the CCP, stated that “China has no chance 
to develop itself without the world while the world needs China to go 
ahead with development.” At the same time, however, he emphasised 
that China “will never copy the mode of the Western political institu-
tions,” but “fi rmly uphold the idea that Chinese affairs must be handled 
by Chinese people in a Chinese way, and oppose any foreign forces to 
interfere in Chinese domestic affairs” (Hu 2008).2
1 I am grateful to Clemens Stubbe Østergaard, Andreas Steen, and two anonymous 
referees for their comments on the fi rst draft of this paper.
2 The translation is taken from the English language website of the People’s Daily 
[online]. http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6557160.html (accessed 25 
January 2009).
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Hu here paraphrased the general strategy of the CCP for the last three 
decades: An ever closer integration into the global capitalist economy 
and international institutions accompanied not by a transition to liberal 
democracy – as many in the West had hoped for – but by an adaptation 
and expansion of the party-state’s repertoire of ruling techniques in or-
der to meet the new demands.
In this paper I will argue that the two symbiotic narratives of “open-
ing” and “globalization” make it possible for CCP leaders to present 
their policies, and in a wider perspective their rule, as an objective ne-
cessity. Opening is described as a voluntary and active policy initiated 
by the Chinese party-state,3 while globalization is referred to as an inev-
itable and objective economic trend. I call these two narratives symbi-
otic because they complement each other and compensate for each oth-
ers’ shortcomings. China’s “opening” signals a reform-oriented leader-
ship that dares to face the challenges of the world, while “globalization” 
explains why the state must be strong and unifi ed in order to represent 
Chinese people’s interests on the global scene. Together the two dis-
courses pave the way for a representation of the CCP as a competent 
and rational manager of national interests in a competitive world where 
nation-states are still the main players.
The paper outlines fi ve stages in the construction of these narratives. 
The fi rst section looks at Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening policy 
from 1978, its historical background, and the understanding of China’s 
role in the world on which it was based. During the 1980s China’s in-
creasing integration into the world generated fast economic growth and 
deep social change, but it also led to tensions between different percep-
tions of how China should open to the outside world, in particular in the 
political and cultural fi elds. These tensions are the topic of the second 
section, while the following part looks at the offi cial discourse in the 
1990s, when the term globalization became part of the Chinese politi-
cal vocabulary. At this stage authoritative media established globaliza-
tion as a challenging but inevitable trend that must be controlled by a 
strong state.
3 In China, the CCP and the state constitute formally separate hierarchies, but the 
Communist Party has de facto control over the state apparatus. Following what has 
become a convention in the academic literature, I use the expression ”the party-state” 
or ”the Party” to designate this phenomenon.
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Parallel to China’s integration into the global economy the CCP 
embarked on a substantial internal transformation in order to be bet-
ter prepared for any challenges that might occur with globalization. In 
the fourth section I look at this process through the lens of a number 
of speeches given in 2000 and 2001 by CCP general secretary Jiang 
Zemin. China joined the WTO in December 2001, so the speeches were 
given at a crucial moment for relations between China and the world, 
and they show how the parallel narratives of opening and globalization 
were basically in place by that time.
Finally, the Beijing Olympics in 2008 presented an occasion for the 
Chinese authorities to educate the public on the correct perception of 
and attitude to the increasing number of exchanges between Chinese and 
foreigners resulting from the opening/globalization process. Through 
the education campaigns discussed in the last section of the paper peo-
ple in Beijing and around the country were taught how to interpret cul-
tural differences in a way that matched the offi cial narratives.
The focus will thus be on how China’s leaders have told the sto-
ry. One encouraging result of the Reform and Opening has been the 
creation of opportunities for the Chinese to express a wider variety of 
views. A broad range of interpretations and viewpoints on globalization 
can be found in Chinese academic journals, in newspaper columns, and 
on the internet, as convincingly demonstrated by several writers (Yu 
2008, Knight 2008, Bhattacharya 2008, Garrett 2001). Neo-liberal, cul-
tural conservative, and new-left voices can all be heard in this debate, 
so the discourse presented below is the dominant one, but it is not ab-
solutely hegemonic.
2. China’s re-entry into the world
The term globalization is often, and for good reasons, regarded with 
some scepticism. When did this process actually start, and how much 
has really changed? In contrast to most other people in the world, how-
ever, the Chinese can put a precise date on their re-entry onto the glo-
bal scene: The announcement of the Reform and Opening policy in De-
cember 1978. China had, of course, had many contacts with the outside 
world before, even during the modern period. In the early 20th century, 
for example, cities like Shanghai and Harbin were bustling internation-
al hubs with large foreign communities and intense international trade, 
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and after the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 technicians 
from the Soviet Union and other communist countries were a common 
sight in many Chinese cities. However, after the Sino-Soviet break in 
1960 China became more isolated. The country’s leaders perceived the 
major global powers as either capitalist/imperialist (the West) or revi-
sionist/hegemonic (the Soviet block), and in this world inhabited by 
hostile forces self-reliance became the ideal. Except for diplomats there 
were very few foreigners in China, equally few Chinese were allowed 
to travel abroad, and the economy was geared to self-suffi ciency. The 
offi cial ideology talked about proletarian internationalism, but there 
was little in people’s lives to indicate that there was a world outside 
China. Hardly any goods in the shops were of foreign origin and op-
portunities to access non-Chinese culture were limited, with Vietnam-
ese and North Korean movies and a small selection of translated novels 
describing ordinary people’s sufferings in the capitalist countries being 
the exception to these restrictions.
Today, only three decades later, China’s international exchange of 
goods, capital, people, and ideas is massive. Even in remote villages 
young kids now know the names of football players in the Italian Serie 
A, and their relatives are likely to work in faraway factories producing 
toys or sports gear for the global market. The specifi c effects of China’s 
opening have converged with, and reinforced, the general trends we 
talk about as globalization, and the outcome has been a thorough and 
acutely felt transformation of social life.
Deng Xiaoping probably could not predict all these consequences of 
the Opening policy when he announced it, but when he gained politi-
cal power in 1978 he realised that it was necessary to increase the fl ow 
of capital and technology from the outside world to turn China into the 
modernized and prosperous country he dreamed of. He was, however, 
confi dent that it would be possible to control the process he was ini-
tiating. With a famous phrase he compared the China of the Cultural 
Revolution era (1966–1976) to a house with closed doors and windows 
and a stuffy atmosphere. By 1978 the time had come to open the win-
dows, he said, and let in some fresh air. Even if a few fl ies (read: West-
ern bourgeois ideas) slipped in at the same time, it would not be a ma-
jor problem.4 Deng was a fi rm supporter of opening China’s economy 
4 I have not been able to fi nd out on which occasion Deng used this image, but it 
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to the outside world, and comparing foreign ideological impact to a 
couple of fl ies rather than, say, a fl ood wave or an invasion was meant 
to calm down the many sceptics inside the CCP leadership, but he was 
probably also genuinely convinced that China would be able to fi lter the 
foreign inputs, use what was benefi cial and keep the disagreeable ele-
ments out.
This view echoed the Chinese response to the Western challenge in 
the last half of the nineteenth century, when the country suffered nu-
merous defeats at the hands of the Western powers and Japan, start-
ing with the fi rst Opium War (1840–1842). The moderate reformer 
Zhang Zhidong advanced in 1898 the slogan of “Chinese learning for 
the fundamental principles, Western learning for practical application” 
(zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong) as a strategy that could save China by 
reforming schools and industry without changing the country’s Confu-
cian values or the political system (Teng/Fairbank 1963: 164-166). Oth-
ers suggested more drastic reforms, and after the fall of the Qing dy-
nasty in 1911, and particularly with the May Fourth Movement starting 
in 1919, radical reformers also attacked the “fundamental principles” 
of traditional China. However, the ti-yong discourse of selectively bor-
rowing “practical” elements from abroad without adopting wholesale 
the Western social, political or cultural institutions and values remained 
strong, and it was revived by the reformist Communist leaders during 
the Opening policy.
The Special Economic Zones that were established from 1980 on-
wards in a few carefully selected areas along the coast – such as Shen-
zhen close to Hong Kong and Xiamen across the strait from Taiwan – 
were physical manifestations of this idea. They offered advantages to 
foreign investors, but they also controlled and encapsulated the foreign 
presence. During this early phase of the Opening, things foreign were 
certainly considered useful, but they were to be placed in designated 
mental and geographic zones whose borders could be controlled by the 
Chinese state.
From the very beginning of the Opening in 1978 China’s reintegra-
tion into the world was thus a conscious strategic move by the country’s 
has consistently been attributed to him, both in China and abroad. The origin of other 
colourful expressions by Deng, such as ‘It doesn’t matter if the cat is black or white as 
long as it catches mice’ is, in fact, equally obscure.
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political leaders. The term used for the opening, kaifang, is a verb indi-
cating a process of liberation from control and constraints. Kai means 
to open and fang is to set free, so the word signals a relaxation of the 
narrow state control over contacts with other countries that had char-
acterized Mao’s time. China is positioned as the active partner in this 
process, it deliberately decided to become kaifang, unlike the opening 
that was forced upon China after the Opium Wars. Besides referring to 
a more open attitude to the outside world, kaifang also had positive con-
notations of less political control over people’s personal and economic 
life, and a livelier and more relaxed cultural atmosphere.
3. Opening or “wholesale Westernization”?
As a result of the opening, imported goods and foreign ideas, lifestyles, 
and popular culture became increasingly popular among Chinese citi-
zens, particularly students and other young urbanites. Throughout the 
1980s it became evident that Deng’s “fl ies through the open window” 
metaphor no longer suffi ced to describe the growing tension between 
representations of “Chinese” and “foreign”. A six part TV documen-
tary Deathsong of the River (Heshang) from 1988 presented a radical 
reinterpretation of this theme in Chinese history, when it contrasted an 
isolated and stagnating China, symbolized by the Yellow River, with an 
open and progressive Western culture represented by the blue sea. Ac-
cording to the critical young intellectuals behind this TV series the fear 
of foreign infl uence is something uniquely Chinese:
 The greatest diffi culty of reform lies perhaps in that we are always 
worrying: “Are the Chinese people still Chinese?” We seem not to 
realize that throughout the past two or three centuries in the West, 
no matter whether it was the Renaissance, the Reformation, or the 
Enlightenment movement, Western Europeans at least never worried 
whether after reform they would still be Italian or German or French. 
Only in China is this the greatest taboo of all (Su/Wang 1991: 212).
The script writers identifi ed China’s isolation from the outside world as 
the main cause of its historical decline and linked its autocratic political 
system and low level of economic development to its Confucian tradi-
tion. The “true spirit of science” and “a true democratic consciousness” 
would never grow out of the “dirt-yellow land” (p. 212), so in order to 
regain its vitality the Yellow River “must eliminate its fear of the sea” 
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(p. 268) and fi nally fl ow into the ocean. The message was thus that Chi-
na should absorb much more than just investments and advanced tech-
nology from the West, it was the entire national spirit or mentality that 
should be changed.
Deathsong of the River drew enormous attention both in China and 
abroad, and it sparked off a heated debate about China’s relations with 
the West. It was accused of advocating “wholesale Westernization” 
(quanpan xihua) (Su/Wang 1991: 312), a term which was fi rst promot-
ed by the liberal thinker Hu Shi in 1929 but later has been used to criti-
cize an unpatriotic awe of the West. Su Xiaokang, the most prominent 
of the script writers later played a major role in the Beijing uprising of 
1989, and after the violent suppression of the democracy movement he 
was placed high on the authorities’ list of “wanted criminals.” His vi-
sion of how far China’s opening to the West could go had overstepped 
the limits of what the post-Tiananmen CCP leadership could tolerate, 
and he had to fl ee to the USA.
The demonstrations on Tiananmen Square and their subsequent sup-
pression marked a turning point for China’s Opening policy. The factors 
leading to the demonstrations and the course of events are complex and 
well documented, and the foreign/Chinese dichotomy was only one of 
several themes in the confl ict.5 However, the short-term effects of June 
1989 on the Opening policy were very serious. The Chinese leadership 
was met with universal criticism from the West and became a global 
symbol of ossifi ed tyranny, and inside China violent suppression was 
followed by ideological campaigns that linked pro-democracy demon-
strators with “hostile forces” threatening China from abroad. The in-
creasing hostility between China and the West, particularly the USA, 
“left a legacy of suspicion that fed into the very different intellectual at-
mosphere that would emerge in the 1990s” (Fewsmith 1999: 42-43).
The economic opening was only briefl y blocked, however. In Janu-
ary 1992 Deng Xiaoping visited two of the fi rst special economic zones, 
both successful symbols of the Reform and Opening policy, and con-
fi rmed his continued support for the idea behind them. In spite of resist-
ance from some CCP leaders China thus avoided a return to the closed-
door policy of the pre-1978 period, and the process of ever closer inte-
5 Among the many insightful treatments of these events are Saich 1990 and Brook 
1992.
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gration into global capitalism could continue unabated. In contrast, the 
intellectual climate never returned to the honeymoon days of the 1980s 
when many Chinese had a highly idealized perception of the West. In 
the 1990s the general tone in the public media became more scepti-
cal towards the Western powers and the relevance of Western ideas for 
China. Patriotic education was stressed in schools, and many intellectu-
als expressed strong nationalist sentiments (Gries 2004, Hughes 2006). 
The CCP did not intend to let the Opening herald the closing stage of 
its own rule.
4. Globalization as a double-edged sword
From the middle of the 1990s the discourse of opening was supple-
mented by one of globalization. In the Chinese word for globalization, 
quanqiuhua, quanqiu means the globe, or global, and -hua is a suffi x 
similar to -ization or -ifi cation in English, designating a change towards 
the state specifi ed by the fi rst part of the word. Unlike the process of 
kaifang, globalization is something that China and the rest of the world 
is exposed to, not the result of political choice.
This section looks at how the term was used in the People’s Daily 
(Renmin ribao) particularly in the 1990s when the concept was defi ned. 
The Chinese press is much more pluralistic now than during Mao’s 
time, and newspapers such as the World Economic Herald (Shijie jingji 
daobao) from Shanghai and Guangzhou’s Southern Weekend (Nanfang 
zhoumo) and Southern Metropolis (Nanfang dushibao) have, at differ-
ent times, demonstrated that it is possible to carve out space for critical 
journalism in spite of the censorship. The People’s Daily, however, still 
functions as the offi cial mouthpiece of the Party. This does not mean 
that every single article can be read as authoritative. Columnists and 
commentators are allowed to express divergent views on many ques-
tions, including the causes and effects of globalization, but the general 
trend in the paper’s coverage of major issues still expresses the views 
of the majority fraction in the Chinese leadership. A closer look at how 
globalization has been discussed in this newspaper can therefore show 
which understanding of the term the party-state has been promoting.
The term fi rst appeared in the People’s Daily as early as 1986, but it 
was rarely used during Deng Xiaoping’s time in power, and then only 
in connection with trends and events abroad, typically reports on a cri-
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sis in the global fi nancial markets or in a Japanese or US multination-
al company. Up to 1996 globalization was still seen as something go-
ing on “out there” which had only an indirect impact on China. From 
around 1996, however, China was increasingly presented as an integrat-
ed part of the global economy. In 1996 Li Tieying who was then chair-
man of the powerful State Commission for Restructuring the Economy 
and member of the Politburo described very straightforwardly the role 
of China in the global division of labour:
 Following the penetration of economic globalization, the developed 
countries, during the continued process of raising their industrial 
structure to a higher level, will transfer more and more medium and 
low level production to other countries. Considering China’s stage 
of development and our stable political and social environment we 
present an ideal place of investment for this kind of capital transfer (Li 
1996).
Li evidently pictured China in the low end of the capitalist food chain, 
offering cheap labour and social stability to foreign companies, but he 
was very optimistic in his assessment of globalization. His main con-
clusion was that China was entering the world at full speed, and that 
this trend would be to the mutual benefi t of China and the world, be-
cause China was not just a producer of cheap goods but also presented 
a promising market for foreign companies.
During the Asian fi nancial crisis that started in 1997 the tone in the 
Chinese media became more cautious, and since that time the People’s 
Daily has repeatedly used the metaphor of a double-edged sword to de-
scribe the positive and negative potentials of globalization. It is said 
to offer enormous possibilities for China and other developing coun-
tries, but it can also lead to further polarization between rich and poor, 
and to a marginalization of those less developed countries that are not 
suffi ciently competitive. The problematic aspects of globalization are 
normally presented as common conditions for all developing countries, 
and while it is acknowledged that some countries in Africa and other 
places are more likely than China to succumb under the pressure of the 
market forces, the People’s Daily downplays the competition between 
developing countries for foreign investments.
From the late 1990s economic globalization was consistently pre-
sented as an objective fact, a “historic tidal wave”, a turn of the “wheel 
of history.” In spite of all dangers involved in the new global process-
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es, ignoring them was not an option. Instead China must try to make 
the best of the situation. As one researcher expressed it in the newspa-
per in 1998, some rules in the international economic game were fair 
enough and benefi cial to China, so China would obey them. Other rules 
were also fair but did not benefi t China, and in those cases China would 
slowly have to adapt to them. Finally, some rules were unreasonable 
and harmful to China and other developing countries, so China should 
resist them and try to change them (Gu Yuanyang 1998). The wheel of 
history could not be stopped, but it could be pushed in a direction that 
would benefi t China.
As can be seen from Table 1, the People’s Daily’s use of the term glo-
balization peaked in 2001, when China joined the WTO in December. 
As many as 933 articles mentioned the word that year, more than ever 
before or after.
1985   0 1997 135
1986   1 1998 349
1987   3 1999 429
1988   5 2000 823
1989   6 2001 933
1990 13 2002 781
1991   8 2003 692
1992   7 2004 619
1993   9 2005 696
1994 16 2006 638
1995 50 2007 645
1996 86 2008 372
Figure 1. Number of articles in the People’s Daily mentioning the word glo-
balization6
Joining the WTO could have proved problematic for many Chinese, 
particularly farmers who were not necessarily able to compete on the 
world market, so the media worked intensely on shaping a favourable 
6  I have used the search term globalization (quanqiuhua) in the full text of all ar-
ticles in the Chinese electronic version of the People’s Daily: Renmin Ribao dianziban 
1946–2008.
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public opinion about the topic. Few farmers read the People’s Daily but 
the local offi cials, who constitute its key audience, had to be well pre-
pared for any dissatisfaction that might occur. The main impression left 
by the media was that globalization was a process full of dangers, and 
that only strong and competent nation-states, such as China, could tame 
the transnational companies and other global actors.
In Marxist terms the CCP justifi ed its embrace of globalization and 
global capitalism by emphasizing the development of the productive 
forces as the determining power in history while ignoring the other cru-
cial element in Marxist development theory: Class struggle (Knight 
2008: 89-117). According to this legitimizing narrative the main task 
of the CCP was to develop the productive forces by attracting foreign 
investments and technology. Seeing globalization as a victory of capi-
talism was a mistake, the Chinese were told. On the contrary, globali-
zation would sharpen the inherent contradictions in capitalist states and 
thus strengthen the socialist world in the long run. In Knight’s (2008: 
108) words:
 The struggle is thus portrayed as an economic struggle between na-
tions of different ideological and political persuasions, a struggle that 
will result in the economic decline of the capitalist nations and rise and 
eventual victory of the socialist nations.
While China’s ever closer integration into the global economy was pre-
sented almost as a law of nature, the People’s Daily showed a much 
more sceptical attitude towards other aspects of globalization. In the 
article mentioned above, Gu Yuanyang (1998) admitted that globaliza-
tion was not just about economy, but the non-economic examples he 
mentioned were all about negative trends and problems that must be 
solved through international cooperation, such as pollution, internation-
al crime, and drugs. Other articles mentioned AIDS and Mad Cow Dis-
ease as typical outcomes of globalization. When political globalization 
was mentioned it was often accompanied by a warning against using 
the concept as a cover for promoting Western values and interests, like 
when the USA allegedly used globalization as an argument for its inter-
vention in Yugoslavia in 1999 (Huang 1999), or when Western lawyers 
argued for more supranational legislation (Shen 1999).
In the cultural fi eld, the People’s Daily prefers the term diversifi ca-
tion (duoyanghua) to globalization. Cultural diversity should be pro-
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tected and Americanization avoided at all costs. In this spirit the Peo-
ple’s Daily has reported positively on European resistance to cultural 
homogenization based on US culture and on events that show how na-
tions and people all over the world turn against American cultural inva-
sion. The image of the doubled-edged sword also leaves room for sym-
pathy with globalization sceptics outside China. Instead of denouncing 
all opposition as reactionary a commentator from the prestigious Tsing-
hua University explained that “anti-globalization does not mean oppo-
sition to globalization as such but to all the different problems that glo-
balization brings along.” What people around the world are opposed to 
is the American neo-liberal version of globalization with its increasing 
social disparities, but this is only one of several paths that globaliza-
tion may follow (Pang 2001). However, the offi cial press does not give 
much space to Chinese anti-globalization voices.
5. How globalization changed the CCP
By the turn of the 21st century the globalization narrative outlined above 
was fi rmly in place, but that did not mean that a completely unifi ed Chi-
nese leadership subscribed to it. China’s accession to the WTO was a 
disputed move, and in early 2000 Li Peng, chairman of the National 
People’s Congress, attacked the market oriented policies of Party secre-
tary Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji (Fewsmith 2001: 228-229). 
But Jiang and Zhu had accepted globalization as an economic reality and 
decided to have a proactive attitude towards the many new challenges. 
China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 was perhaps the most signifi cant 
manifestation of the route they chose, but the top leaders’ understand-
ing of the world had consequences far beyond the fi elds of international 
trade. Parallel to China’s integration into the global economy the CCP 
embarked on a substantial transformation of the party’s guiding ideol-
ogy, recruitment patterns, and ruling techniques in order to adjust itself 
to the “new historical conditions” (Jiang 2001: 1).
These transformations were announced by Jiang Zemin, who was 
general secretary of the CCP from 1989 to 2002 and China’s president 
from 1993 to 2003. Towards the end of his time in offi ce, Jiang intro-
duced the theory of “the three representations” (sange daibiao), which 
defi ned the Party’s role for the 21st century. According to Jiang (2001: 
2), the CCP should represent “the requirements of the development of 
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China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation of the development 
of China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the over-
whelming majority of the people in China.”
In order to establish the status of his theory as part of CCP’s ideo-
logical orthodoxy Jiang delivered a number of speeches between Febru-
ary 2000 and July 2001. In August 2001 excerpts from twelve of these 
speeches were published in a volume entitled On “The Three Represen-
tations” (Jiang 2001). Party members were supposed to study this vol-
ume in order to grasp Jiang’s theory. I will treat the twelve speeches as 
one text addressing all CCP members, regardless of the specifi c time 
and audience of each speech. Read as a whole the book sums up Jiang’s 
position and shows how the CCP leadership wanted party members to 
perceive the global situation and its implications for China just after the 
turn of the 21st century.
Jiang made it clear that the Reform and Opening policy had created 
a new class structure with several social groups that did not exist in the 
PRC in pre-reform days, such as private entrepreneurs and traders, in-
dividual farmers, and high-salaried employees in foreign enterprises. 
This increased social diversifi cation required the CCP to understand its 
own role in a new way (p. 8-9). At the same time ideological control 
had been made much more diffi cult by the rapid spread of unauthorized 
information which was one result of the Reform and Opening: “The in-
formation that cadres and masses receive is very rich but also of uneven 
quality, and their ideas are extremely lively, so it is not so easy to unify 
their thinking” (p. 53).
Also the international environment had changed. Socialism had suf-
fered a huge setback after the fall of communist rule in Eastern Europe 
and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and some CCP members had 
subsequently been hit by a “crisis of faith” (p. 55). The collapse of so-
cialism in the Soviet block had to a large extent been caused by consist-
ent Western propaganda, and China was the next target:
 China is now the world’s largest socialist country, and it is continuous-
ly developing and getting richer and stronger every day. Hostile forces 
in the West are speeding up their political strategy of “westernizing” 
and “splitting” our country by all means and in all possible ways, at-
tempting to subvert the CCP leadership and China’s socialist system. 
They are certainly not going to change these political plots (p. 61).
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As part of its efforts to keep China down, the West would use such is-
sues as democracy, human rights, and the Taiwan and Tibet problems, 
and Jiang predicted that the confl ict would be “long and complicat-
ed” (pp. 61-62). However, Western hostility should not make China 
close its doors. The CCP should not repeat the mistakes of the Qing 
dynasty (1644–1911), which had once been the strongest economy in 
the world but – with the well-known disastrous consequences for Chi-
na – had complacently closed its borders in the 19th century and thereby 
missed the industrial revolution and its many technological innovations 
(pp. 36-37). So the double-edged sword should be met with a balanced 
strategy: While China “should stick to the policy of Reform and Open-
ing and strengthen our economic and cultural exchange with the out-
side world, we should at the same time pay close attention to guarding 
against infi ltration and subversion from hostile forces” (p. 62).
Jiang’s analysis goes well beyond the Cold War image of a zero-sum 
battle between socialism and capitalism. In a globalized world the key 
to victory does not primarily lie in military force but in technological 
innovation, according to Jiang. “The present and future global compe-
tition is fundamentally a competition for qualifi ed people (rencai)” (p. 
31), and as “[t]he developed countries fi ght to grasp qualifi ed people all 
over the globe” (p. 68), China must make sure to get its share. These 
“qualifi ed people” can make China a winner in the global competition 
and they constitute the link between Jiang’s analysis of China’s inter-
national position, and his controversial plan for the CCP: The com-
munist party should start recruiting members from the emerging eco-
nomic elite. This plan was presented in its most mature version in the 
last speech included in On “The Three Representations”, delivered on 
1 July 2001 at the 80th anniversary celebrations of the founding of the 
CCP (pp. 143-185). Among the new social strata of private business-
people and highly skilled technical and managerial personnel in both 
Chinese and foreign-owned enterprises, there were many who through 
hard and honest work had “made contributions to the production forces 
in socialist society…” (p. 169). As long as they were loyal to the Par-
ty’s principles, such “excellent elements” (youxiu fenzi) should, accord-
ing to Jiang, be recruited into the CCP. This recruitment policy would 
strengthen social cohesion and strengthen the CCP’s position in Chi-
nese society (p. 170).
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The inclusion of the new social strata of private capitalists and white-
collar employees was, of course, controversial in a self-proclaimed pro-
letarian party such as the CCP, but Jiang had little choice, as he could 
see that the private sector was growing rapidly. By 2005 it would pro-
duce well over half of China’s GDP and an overwhelming share of its 
exports and also create most of the new jobs (OECD 2005: 1). This 
trend was evident already at the turn of the century. Besides being the 
main motors in China’s economic growth, however, the private entre-
preneurs also represented a potential political challenge to CCP rule. 
Jiang’s solution to this problem was to ensure that the party-state would 
be solidly embedded in society, particularly in relation to the new eco-
nomic elite in the private enterprises. As Evans (1995: 248) has shown, 
in order to function properly developmental states, of which China is 
one variety, “must be immersed in a dense network of ties that bind 
them to societal allies with transformational goals”. By integrating the 
economic elite the CCP tried to maintain its dominant position as the 
centre of such networks.
Once the alliance between China’s political and economic elites was 
in place the party-state could set to work on making Chinese enterprises 
more competitive. In this way the party-state behaved as a “competition 
state” in Cerny’s sense:
 Rather than attempt to take certain economic activities out of the mar-
ket, to “decommodify” them as the welfare state [and to an even larg-
er extent the socialist state, ST] was organized to do, the competition 
state has pursued increased marketization in order to make economic 
activities located within the national territory… more competitive in 
international and transnational terms” (Cerny 1997: 259).
The discourse on globalization as an inevitable and irreversible trend, 
which implied intense economic competition between nation-states had 
paved the way for a transformation of the CCP into a more elitist party. 
Translated into practical policy this meant that members of the econom-
ic elite were recruited to the party and given seats in political consulta-
tive conferences and people’s congresses, which have limited power, 
but represent an opportunity for business people to establish useful con-
tacts to offi cials and maybe affect local decisions.7 To the CCP the pres-
7 Political consultative conferences (Zhengxie) are advisory bodies through which 
infl uential members of society can be included in the political process. Their actual 
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ence of successful entrepreneurs lends legitimacy to the political insti-
tutions controlled by the Party.
Even more important links between the party-state and the new eco-
nomic elite are the corporatist business associations that have been es-
tablished all over China. These associations monopolize the organiza-
tion of business interests, facilitate communication between state and 
business and make it possible for the state to supervise and control en-
terprises. But they are fi rst of all arenas for building networks that tie 
the economic and political elites closer to each other. Sociologist David 
Wank (1999) has analyzed how such networks operate in the prosper-
ous city of Xiamen in Fujian province. While we would normally ex-
pect market oriented reforms to liberate business from state control, 
China has rather seen the planned economy being replaced by networks 
of businesspeople and local offi cials. The two groups need each other 
and live in a “symbiotic clientelism” (Wank 1999: 231) to their mutual 
economic and political advantage.
The close relations between businessmen and offi cials are also re-
fl ected in the fact that the political attitudes of the two groups are strik-
ingly similar. In the words of Bruce Dickson (2007: 827), who has done 
several surveys on the political attitudes and values of offi cials and busi-
nessmen: ”Rather than promote democratic governance, China’s capi-
talists have a stake in preserving the political system that has allowed 
them to prosper, and they are among the Party’s most important bases 
of support.” Dickson’s surveys even show that businesspeople are more 
likely than offi cials to think that pluralism can lead to political chaos 
(Dickson 2007: 851).
Another potential threat to the CCP’s control over the globalization 
process could be China’s workers. While the economic elite has a ma-
terial interest in preserving the status quo, the workers have lost many 
of their former privileges since the 1990s, such as job security and the 
provision of cheap housing. A cheap and obedient workforce has been 
one of China’s strong cards in the global competition for foreign invest-
power is very limited, but they can criticize aspects of the party-state’s work and offer 
suggestions. People’s congresses (Renda) at the national, provincial, county, and town-
ship levels constitute China’s parliamentary system. The National People’s Congress 
is China’s legislative body. People’s congresses have recently gained some infl uence 
in China as supervisors of local governments and platforms for moderate criticism but 
they are still controlled by the party-state.
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ments, and the Chinese labour unions are not geared to defend work-
ers’ interests in a market economy. However, although there have been 
many isolated strikes and other types of industrial action, there is lit-
tle evidence that the workers blame the state or the globalization proc-
ess for their problems. Interviews indicate that most workers accept the 
competition of global capitalism almost like a law of nature and explain 
their problems on the job market with their own personal shortcomings 
such as lack of relevant skills (Blecher 2002). In this sense they have 
adapted to the liberalist ideology of a globalized labour market.
Jiang’s suggestions for reforms of the CCP have far-reaching impli-
cations for China’s social and political institutions, and so do the priva-
tization of the economy and other reforms that have been implemented 
since the early 1990’s. However, he cannot be accused of selling out to 
foreigners or of being a naive supporter of globalization, because he 
specifi cally warns against the “hostile forces” of the West. On the oppo-
site front he distances himself from the closed and xenophobic attitude 
of the past (and, implicitly, of rival leaders such as Li Peng) by show-
ing how the “development of the most advanced productive forces” de-
pends on China’s integration into the global economy. This double track 
discourse of opening and globalization is more than just a repetition of 
the ti-yong formula of the Qing period (making use of Western technol-
ogy while preserving the Chinese essence) or even of the “fl ies through 
the window” attitude of the early phase of the opening policy. It inte-
grates a comprehensive opening to the world with one crucial “essence” 
that is still zealously guarded, and which is presented in the speeches 
as a precondition for securing China’s competitive edge in the global 
struggle for economic advantages: The party-state’s monopoly on po-
litical power.
6. The Beijing Olympics and the pedagogy of globalization
In the years that have passed since Jiang made his speeches, China’s 
approach to globalization has developed further. The most signifi cant 
trend is probably a growing self-assurance. The government has imple-
mented a “going out” policy, which means that Chinese companies now 
invest massively abroad while Chinese brands are being much more ac-
tively developed and promoted around the world. China has also turned 
proactive in the cultural fi eld with the establishment of Confucius In-
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stitutes abroad, much like the German Goethe Institutes or the French 
Alliance Francaise. The Confucius Institutes are expected to “promote 
a better understanding of the Chinese language and culture among the 
people of the world; develop friendly relationships between China and 
other countries; accelerate the development of multiculturalism at the 
international level; and help bring about global peace and harmony.”8 
The Beijing Olympics in 2008 presented a perfect opportunity for the 
party-state to demonstrate to the world and not least to its home audi-
ence that China was now a major power and a respected member of the 
international community. The slogan chosen for the Games, One World, 
One Dream, (Tong yige shijie, tong yige mengxiang) signalled shared 
ideals and aspirations across borders, but it was also important that the 
Games had “Chinese characteristics”. This Chineseness was, for exam-
ple, refl ected in the logo, which resembled a person in motion on a red 
background but at the same time could be seen as a symbol of China’s 
cultural heritage. To a Chinese audience the logo looked like an an-
cient Chinese seal engraved with a character that resembled both jing 
(京), meaning ‘capital’, the last character in the name of Beijing, and 
8 Quoted from Confucius Institute Online, http://www.confuciusinstitute.net/blogs/
po/hq/posts/229 (accessed 10 February, 2009).
53
wen (文) which in itself means ‘script’ and is part of words like culture 
(wenhua), civilization (wenming), and literature (wenxue). The opening 
ceremony of the Games, directed by China’s most internationally ac-
claimed fi lm director Zhang Yimou, likewise featured Chinese history 
and traditional culture very prominently (Barmé 2009).9
The prelude to the Games in the spring of 2008 indicated the pro-
blems that might be triggered when China became the focus of global 
attention. China was attacked in the Western media for, among seve-
ral other things, its role in Darfur and Tibet, its lack of human rights, 
and its environmental problems, and the Olympic torch relay was dis-
rupted in Paris and other Western cities. In reply the Chinese internet 
was soon fi lled with virulent verbal denunciations of particularly Japan, 
the USA and France, and in April and May 2008 there were demonstra-
tions against Carrefour in several Chinese towns after the French super-
market chain had been accused by Chinese Internet users of supporting 
the Dalai Lama (Xinhua 2008).
Confrontations between foreigners and Chinese were detrimental to 
China’s ambitions for the Olympics, and the party-state had worked 
hard to prevent them. It had been decided early on that the citizens of 
Beijing should learn to be worthy ambassadors of China and leave the 
foreign guests with a favourable impression. The city’s taxi drivers at-
tended English classes, and there were campaigns to stop people from 
spitting in the street and jumping queues. As a central part of this cam-
paign a set of textbooks in 13 volumes addressing different audiences 
was published in August 2006, two years prior to the event (Beijing Ao-
yunhui 2006a). It was edited by a committee of specialists from several 
offi cial bodies involved in the games with the help of researchers from 
some of China’s most renowned universities. Two of these textbooks 
addressed two groups who would come into direct contact with foreign-
ers: Volunteers (Beijing Aoyunhui 2006b) and employees in the service 
sector (Beijing Aoyunhui 2006c). The ideal relationship between Chi-
nese and foreigners outlined in these volumes mirror and reinforce the 
image of China’s relations to the world which had been shaped over the 
years by the narratives of opening and globalization.
9 A recent themed issue of The China Quarterly (no. 197, March 2009) contains four 
illuminating articles on the Beijing Olympics by Anne-Marie Brady, Kevin Latham, 
Susan Brownell, and Geremie R Barmé. 
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The volume for service personnel places the Olympics in the larger 
context of China’s traumatic past. A chapter titled “From the ‘Sick Man 
of Asia’ to a Rising Giant” (Beijing Aoyunhui 2006c: 26-28) says that 
“… our one hundred years of relations with the Olympic movement is a 
distillate of the entire 20th century history of China” (p. 26). Therefore, 
the Olympics are not just about sports. The Games should demonstrate 
for everyone China’s rise in the world: “Let likewise politicians from 
all nations stand under the banner of Olympic peace and contemplate 
the establishment of a new world order, and let shrewd celebrities from 
the business world seek out unlimited business opportunities in an in-
creasingly globalized market…” (p. 44). 
The Chinese who come into direct contact with foreigners represent 
much more than just themselves: “Quite often we represent our work-
place, our profession, and we also represent our city, people and nation” 
(p. 147). In this situation, it is crucial that cultural differences do not 
spoil the harmony between Chinese and foreigners. The textbook men-
tions some typical examples of misunderstandings rooted in cultural 
differences. A foreigner will open a gift in front of the giver, although 
this is considered impolite in China. An elderly foreign man cannot ac-
cept that a young Chinese woman carries his bag, although she just 
wants to express respect for his senior status. A Chinese host orders too 
many dishes to show his hospitality, but his foreign guests see this as a 
waste of food (p. 146-147). The volunteers’ textbook has a section on 
taboos, which likewise takes for granted that individuals represent their 
cultures, and that these cultures are defi ned either by nation-state or by 
religion. The volunteers learn, for example, that Mexicans and Indians 
do not like the colour white, while Ethiopians and Brazilians have an 
aversion to yellow, and Belgians and Iraqis avoid blue. Christians con-
sider Friday an inauspicious day, Muslims do not eat pork, and Hindus 
avoid beef (Beijing Aoyunhui 2006b: 125-126).
No deeper confl icts of interests are at stake in any of the examples 
taken up by the textbooks, and problems can be solved if the service 
personnel know and respect the relevant cultural differences. However, 
respecting other cultures does not mean that these cultures are in any 
way superior to the Chinese:
 In fact, for historical, economic and cultural reasons there are some 
people in our present society who easily become too enthusiastic and 
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“humble” towards foreign guests from developed countries, while 
feeling superior in front of their own compatriots. However, a truly 
well-bred Westerner will always think that a person who looks down 
upon his fellow countrymen is not worthy of respect! So during the 
Beijing Olympics we must pay special attention to respecting both 
ourselves and the guests (Beijing Aoyunhui 2006c: 147-148).
The textbooks are certainly not aggressively nationalistic, to the con-
trary, they repeatedly stress that foreigners should be greeted with hos-
pitality and respect. At the same time they underpin an understanding 
of global relations that fi ts perfectly into the state-centred narratives 
of opening and globalization. Individuals represent their nation-state 
and their values and habits are defi ned by its culture. Confl icts between 
such national cultures can be solved through dialogue and a better un-
derstanding of each other’s background, but this should not lead to the 
waning of cultural difference. The purpose of the dialogue is rather to 
create a space for each nation to exhibit its cultural characteristics with-
out interference from others.
While preparing Chinese citizens well for their role as Olympic hosts 
this discourse is not of much help when fundamentally different ideo-
logical and political positions clash as happened in the run up to the Ol-
ympics. In confl icts over Tibet, Taiwan, human rights, and several oth-
er issues foreign criticism of Chinese state policies are presented in the 
Chinese media as interference in internal Chinese affairs. As expressed 
by Hu Jintao in the quotation that opened this paper, “Chinese affairs 
must be handled by Chinese people in a Chinese way.” In a comment 
that was probably not meant for an international audience Xi Jinping, 
Hu Jintao’s most likely successor, expressed the same point more blunt-
ly in February 2009: “There are some well-fed foreigners with nothing 
better to do who point their fi ngers at our affairs. First of all, China does 
not export revolution; second, we do not export poverty and hunger; 
and third, we do not cause you any trouble. So what can they say?”10 To 
10 Xi made this remark at a meeting with Mexicans of Chinese descent. A video of 
the occasion was circulated widely on the internet. For the quotation in print and a 
very positive Chinese comment on Xi’s viewpoint see [online] http://news.sina.com/
ch/xinhuanet/102-101-101-102/2009-02-12/19283633091.html (accessed 13 February 
2009).
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Hu and Xi, of course, the CCP represents the Chinese people and can 
speak on its behalf. 
7. Conclusion
The simultaneity of the international spread of the globalization dis-
course with China’s own policy of Reform and Opening led to a pos-
itive and proactive Chinese approach to globalization. A strong state 
was seen as a prerequisite for making China a winner in the global 
competition, and to guarantee sustained Party rule under the new eco-
nomic conditions Jiang Zemin led a transformation of the CCP, which 
tied the economic elite more closely to the Party. It is still too early to 
say what the long-term international and domestic consequences of this 
transformation will be, but for the moment it has been successful. Even 
among industrial workers and other underprivileged social groups the 
symbiotic discourses of opening and globalization promoted an under-
standing of China’s economic growth as a result of the opening policy, 
while social problems, poor work conditions, and increasing inequality 
can be blamed on objective mechanisms governing the global capital-
ist market. 
China’s engagement with the world is not only economic, but also 
cultural and political. In these fi elds CCP leaders have used the term 
globalization only reluctantly and established a discourse of cultural 
and political diversity in its place. In encounters with foreigners, like 
those that took place before and during the Beijing Olympics, Chinese 
people are seen as representing their nation, and tensions are reduced 
to cultural differences which should be accepted as natural. In this con-
struction of the global there is little room for foreign criticism of Chi-
na.
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